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As a purely tentative suggestion, could we not talk about "value
judgments ?" They compare conveniently with law judgments or indeed
with court decisions, or the total content of the law in a general sense.
For my part, I quite agree that moral values are more than "criticized
experience" or other pragmatic concepts, no matter how expertly these
concepts are developed. But I submit that value judgments are made
in the active sense by human beings and that the whole of the human
conscience, understanding, and will (along with consciousness and other
elements which may be included) are used in piroducing these value judgments. On conscience, then, we .can all stand, in giving every element
of the Good to the law that is so dear to us, while each retains for himself
the sources of spiritual strength which he derives from his own personal
allegiances.
PAUL SAYRE.t

By Morris Ploscowe.* New York: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1951. Pp. ix, 310. $3.95.
SEX AND THE LAW.

Sex and the Law is a comprehensive, well-organized examination
and analysis of the case and statutory law, both civil and criminal,
regulating sexual activity in the United States at the present time.
Judge Ploscowe's" approach to such a diversified and far-reaching
subject is ideal, for he not only compares and discusses .state by state
the various laws, pointing out the defects, inconsistencies, and problems
caused by their differences, but also makes an internal analysis of the
laws within various states. In consequence, the full effect of society's
attempt, through law, to regulate sexual behavior is exposed.
Nowhere is the sex law more incongruous and lacking in reality
than in the regulation of marriage. For example, every jurisdiction has,
either by statute or by common law, established an age of consent for
marriag-that is, the age at which a boy or girl may enter into a legally
binding marriage. At the English common law, the age of consent was
fourteen for the boy and twelve for the girl. The age most frequently
found throughout the United States at the present, however, is eighteen
years for males and sixteen years for females. In no instance has a
legislature set the age at twenty-one, which is the usual age of consent in
the case of ordinary contracts. The anomaly exists, therefore, that while
a boy or girl under twenty-one years is not bound by an agreement to
t Professor of Law, State University of Iowa College of Law.
* New York City Magistrate; Author of Kefauver Committee Report on Crime
in the United States.
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buy a twenty-five cent comic book or a dollar hair ribbon, the same boy
and girl may enter into a binding marriage with one another.
More bewildering is the fact that even though the boy or girl may
not be of the age of consent set by the statute, so long as the under-age
party is not under seven years, the marriage is generally not regarded as
void but only voidable, and then only by the parties themselves. Unless
disaffirmed, such a marriage will become completely binding upon reaching the age of consent.
Parental consent when the boy is under twenty-one years and the
girl is under eighteen years is another requirement found in almost every
state. If one party is above the age of consent for marriage but within
the statutory age limit requiring parental consent, the law requires that
before a license shall be issued the parent must acknowledge his consent
in writing. Such statutes have, in general, one defect: their violation
merely subjects the license clerk to a penalty; the courts have almostuniversally held the resulting irregular marriage to be valid and binding
upon all concerned.
Should the clerk refuse to issue the license, however, and if a minister
or other person authorized and willing to perform the marriage ceremony
can be found, the marriage will, in most jurisdictions, be binding, for
the license statutes have generally been interpreted to be directory rather
than mandatory. If a willing minister cannot be found, the parties may
still, in twenty-odd states, enter into a common law marriage, which is
just as binding as a formal ceremonial marriage. The fact that legislatures permit the anomaly of the licensing and parental consent statutes
and the common law marriage to continue in co-existence is not only
logically indefensible, but causes real tragedy by the recognition of common law marriages. All that is generally required for such marriages
is an agreenient by two competent persons to take each other as husband and wife. As far as the law is concerned, there need be no
witnesses, no formal words, the agreement may take place at any time
or place, may be oral or written, and may be proved by the express
words of the parties or implied from their conduct. Even the layman will
immediately recognize that the determination of whether or not.a common law marriage actually was entered into could, in many instances,
be arrived at with almost as much certainty by the toss of a coin. Yet.
upon this decision rests rights to property, legitimacy of children, and
social approval br disapproval. The pity of it all is that there is absolutely no need today for the common law marriage, since marriage license
officials and persons authorized to perform marriage ceremonies are
everywhere readily accessible.
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Unfortunately, in real life, not all persons when once married live
happily ever after. Many attempt to make the most of a bad situation,
but others, in ever-increasing numbers, turn to the divorce courts to rid
themselves of their unwanted spouses.
Traditionally, it was felt that divorce should be granted only for the
gravest kind of misconduct-misconduct so serious that it would render
any further cohabitation unsafe or intolerable. Today, however, the
legislatures have expanded the grounds for divorce to include such causes
as non-support, personal indignities and incompatibility of temperament.
An even greater exparision has been effected by the courts through their
liberal interpretation of the meaning of such words. Judge Ploscowe
clearly states the situation, using mental cruelty as an example, when
he says:
It is obvious that with the boundaries of mental cruelty so
poorly defined and with so much discretion in the hands of the
trial court, whether or not a judge will grant a divorce in a particular case on the ground of mental cruelty will depend to a
considerable degree upon his general attitude toward marriage
and divorce. (P. 69.)
There are many other grounds which are just as poorly defined and to
which his statement is, in general, just as applicable.
Another traditional concept of American law has been that a divorce
is granted only to a party who is himself free from misconduct. If both
parties are guilty of conduct which would, standing alone, be grounds
for divorce, the court is obliged to affirm the marriage. Since the law
forbids divoilce by consent of the parties, such couples, theoretically,
must remain married or the law must be violated. In actual practice, the
latter is far more frequent than the former and is accomplished by the
quite simple method of having one of the parties "consent" to the divorce
by not contesting it. Since the courts lack means with which to make
their own investigations, they are generally content to accept the plaintiff's evidence at face value. Thus, there is ample opportunity to fabricate the evidence required for divorce with a better-than-even chance of
getting away with it.
A layman might well conclude that marriage would appear to be
the only real requirement for divorce: and as long as common law marriages are recognized he cannot even be certain of that!
The crazy-quilt legislation produced by the state legislatures in the
area of the criminal law is further evidence of the thorough revision
needed if a rational sex policy is to be achieved. Every state has a socalled statutory rape statute--i.e., a statute declaring intercourse by a
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man or boy with a girl under the age set by the statute to be rape, even
though the girl consented. Under these statutes, the girl is conclusively
presumed to be incapable of c6nsenting to sexual intercourse, on the
theory that she is too young to understand the nature and consequences
of her act. As long as the age of consent set by statute reasonably approaches reality one cannot complain too strenuously. When it is found,
however, that some twenty-one states set the age of consent at eighteen
years, and Tennessee at twenty-one, and that in most jurisdictions the
conclusive presumption that the girl did not know the nature and consequences of her act applies even though she was unchaste or in fact a
prostitute, one begins to wonder whether our legislators are aware of
the facts of life.
Also, in many states the statutory age at which a girl may consent
to marriage (and indirectly, of course, to sexual intercourse) is lower
than the age at %hich her consent to intercourse outside the bonds of
marriage will serve as a defense to a charge of rape. Therefore, although
the girl may be married, if she consents to intercourse with one other
than her husband, her paramour may be convicted of rape. And,. if the
particular jurisdiction does not have an adultery statute, it would be
possible to have a situation whereby the paramour is guilty of rape'
as a result of intercourse with a seventeen year old married prostitute,
whereby he would have been guilty only of a transgression of the mores
had he had intercourse with an eighteen or nineteen year old married
female who was not a prostitute.
At the present time, adultery is not punished at all in Louisiana, New
Mexico, and Tennessee, and thirteen states do not punish single or occasional acts of intercourse; but make criminal only the "living" or
"cohabiting" in adultery. The possible penalties upon conviction of
adultery range from a maximum five year imprisonment and/or $1,000
fine imposed by Vermont, to a flat, mandatory fine of $10 exacted by
Maryland. Between these poles may be found many gradational
variations.
An even clearer illustration of the whimsical character of the criminal law is found upon examining the regulation of fornication. In
thirteen states fornication is not punished at all and fifteen jurisdictions
prohibit only the "cohabiting" or "living" in a state of fornication. Upon
conviction for a single act of fornication the maximum jail sentence is
found upon the statute books of Oregon, where the penalty is from one
to five years. (The statute applies only when the girl is under eighteen
years of age.) The minimum incarceration is imposed by North Dakota
where thirty days is regarded as adequate. The possible fines in states
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prosecuting single acts of fornication range from a minimum of not
more than $10 in Rhode Island to a maximum of $1,000 in-Georgia,
while Virginia and West Virginia grant the court discretion to impose
any amount deemed adequate.
Relatively light punishments are also inflicted by states which penalize only the living in a state of fornication, as is evidenced by the fact
that in only five jurisdictions is the permissible sentence greaterthan six
months, while six states set a six months' limit and seven others prohibit incarceration entirely. The fines imposed for cohabiting in fornication vary from the $1,000 maxima imposed by Kansas, Missouri,
Georgia and Nevada to the Arkansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming exactions
of $100, while North Carolina and Alabama prescribe no limits whatsoever. A comparison of statutes regulating incest, sodomy, seduction, and
rape show the same widespread divergencies.
One would hardly expect that forty-eight legislatures would produce
identical legislation in regard to any specific phase of sexual activity. It
is astounding, however, in a nation whose mores have always prohibited
all sexual activity outside the bonds of marriage, that such great discrepancies should be the rule rather than the exception.
Judge Ploscowe's examination clearly shows the need for a thorough
revision of the sex law if it is to effectively and realistically meet the
every-day needs of society. Equally important, however, it shows that
to reach this goal such revision must be made by experts who have the
time, inclination, and facilities to treat each question in the regulation of
sexual activity as part of an integrated whole, instead of dealing with
each as though it were an isolated entity incapable of affecting any other.
While the book is a scholarly analysis of the laws regulating sexual
behavior, it is easy to read and to understand and should be as interesting
to the layman as to the lawyer or social scientist. Needless to say, it
should be required reading for every state legislator. .
ROBERT C. BENsING.jt Associate Professor of Law, Western Reserve University School of Law.

